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Institutions and Economic Performance: 
What Can Be Explained?
* 
 
Institutions are now widely believed to be important in explaining performance. In this paper, 
we analyze whether commonly used measures of institutions have any significant, 
measurable impact on performance, whether of countries or firms. We look at three ‘levels’ of 
institutions and associated conjectures. The first concerns whether the political system 
affects performance. The second concerns whether the business and investment 
environment affects the performance of countries and the third concerns whether perceived 
business constraints directly affect the performance of firms. In all instances, we find little 
evidence of a robust link between widely used measures of institutions and our indicators of 
performance. We consider why this might be the case and argue that mis-measurement, mis-
specification, complexity and non-linearity are all relevant factors. 
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1. Introduction 
Twenty five years ago most analysis of the economic performance of countries or firms 
would have hardly mentioned the role of institutions. Nowadays, the reverse seems true. 
Barely a paper goes by without invoking the influence of institutions on performance. Part 
of this flourishing can be attributed to the impetus given by a wider analytical literature, but 
part can also be attributed to one of its consequences: the proliferation of datasets aiming to 
measure a wide gamut of institutional forms, ranging from political systems to labour 
legislation and taxation systems. Such datasets normally put together observations across 
countries and/or regions and other more disaggregated units of analysis. In this 
proliferation, a simple - but accurate - characterization of the literature would be the 
apparent association of institutions and measures of their quality with economic 
performance. Stated bluntly, there seems now to be a broad consensus that, for example, 
political systems influence performance with democratic systems, in particular, being better 
for growth than non-democratic ones, that democracies tend to have ‘better’ business 
environments – normally defined as those with lower regulation and fewer impediments to 
investment and transacting – and that ‘better’ business environments tend to be associated 
with stronger economic growth when measured at firm level. There are, in addition, 
extensions that also relate subjective measures of well-being – such as happiness or 
satisfaction – to both political systems and other institutional features. Finally, this wide 
consensus has also been echoed in the political and economic dialogue linking international 
financial institutions, as well as bilateral agencies, with developing countries. One 
manifestation of this has been the World Bank’s Doing Business, where disaggregated 
measures of the business environment have been compiled across a large range of countries 
with an explicit view to influencing the content and direction of policy, often through the 
encouragement of rivalry or horse races between countries in the implementation of reform.  
In the light of this apparent convergence in analysis and policy, our paper takes a  
close look at how robust is the relationship between institutions – whether of political 
regimes or of components of the business environment – and economic performance. As 
such, it operates at several ‘levels’ and with several different types of data. The paper is 
organized as follows. Section 2 examines the relationship between political systems – 
principally the presence or absence of democracy – and performance, as measured 
principally by growth in per capita income and real GDP growth. Section 3 then shifts to   3
looking at whether measures of the business environment affect growth at country level 
using for the most part the influential Doing Business dataset, while Section 4 looks at the 
same question using firm level data, in this instance mainly the Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS). In all instances, we find little evidence for a robust 
relationship between these various institutional measures and performance. Section 5 then 
asks why this might be the case and focuses on a combination of factors, including analytical 
reasons as well as those relating to measurement.  
   
2. Political systems and performance 
The hypothesized relationship between political institutions and growth has been traced to a 
number of characteristics. Most generally, it has been argued that features of democracy such 
as political pluralism, institutional checks and balances, and the periodic renewal of 
policymakers through elections protect the economic system against abusive or predatory 
behaviour typical of most authoritative regimes
2. The democratic process is widely viewed as 
more suitable to economic prosperity because of its ability to nurture civil liberties and 
secure property and contract rights. Consequently, it provides agents with incentives to 
undertake investment and maximize welfare. Through defined and protected property rights, 
democracy makes it possible for individuals to examine opportunity costs freely and to 
engage in entrepreneurial behaviour, as argued, inter alia, by North (1990). A key 
conditioning variable, determining much of the effect of regime type on growth, is the 
expectation of citizens and investors that they will be able to capture gains from exchange 
and protect returns to investment. In contrast, autocrats generally cannot make credible 
commitments to securing such rights
3. A variant of this argument concerns the longevity of 
regimes. Olson (1993) has argued that the way in which a regime will function will depend 
on its horizon. Most autocratic regimes tend to behave as if they have short horizons giving 
rise to looting and other behaviour antithetical to growth. Przeworski and Limongi (1993) 
have argued that the court system, independent judiciary, and respect for law and individual 
rights that are needed for a lasting democracy are also required for security of property and 
contract rights. However, it is not clear how these rights are necessarily more secure under 
democracy. Further, when looking at democracies’ economic performance, Olson (1982) 
                                                 
2 See Comeau (2003) 
3 See Olson (1982)   4
argued that democracies succumb to ‘institutional sclerosis’ over time as special interests 
organize to capture rents. Indeed, some forms of dictatorship may actually be more 
encompassing if democratic institutions allow a majority to entrench its position and special 
interests to gain protection. This leads to some ambiguity in the prediction of how political 
regime will influence performance. An additional criticism of democracies has been their 
proclivity to engage in redistributive politics that can have a negative impact on growth
4; 
autocracies in contrast may be under no such pressure. Olson and others have argued that 
stable autocratic regimes can deliver growth successfully. Yet, autocratic regimes tend not to 
be stable over particularly long periods of time, not least due to the ways in which the 
products of growth tend to be distributed
5. Rodrik (2000) has argued that the conflict 
management possibilities in countries with participatory institutions yield less growth 
volatility than in non-democratic societies
6. In addition, he claims that democracies fare 
better at adjusting policies in response to shocks
7.  
 
2.1 Political systems and performance: estimations 
There is a body of literature that has examined the central question of whether political 
systems and institutions affect growth differentially. Weede (1983) used a sample of 89 
countries over the period from 1960 until 1979 and found a negative relationship for the full 
sample, no relationship for the less developed countries and a negative relationship for 
countries for which the ratio of the government revenue and the gross domestic product is 
higher than 20 percent. Estimation was by OLS and no attempt was made to deal with 
                                                 
4 For example, see Barro (1996, 1997). Fernandes and Rodrik (1991) show that rational voters may choose not 
to support efficiency-enhancing reforms because of individual uncertainty about payoffs. Further, governments 
facing elections may pursue policies that maximize the prospects of re-election, even if these are detrimental to 
long-term economic growth. Przeworski and Limongi (1993) argue that democracies may favour policies that 
give priority to current consumption. 
5 A different variant of this theme can be found in the literature on development and innovation where 
autocratic, coordinated regimes – as in South Koreas in the 1960s-1980s – can deliver extensive growth but 
have properties that make the shift to greater innovation led growth difficult, if not impossible, see Aghion et al 
(2007) who extend the Gerschenkron framework 
6  We also generated a simple scatter relating the democracy scores in both Freedom House and Polity IV 
databases that we use in this paper to the average standard deviation of per capita growth. They strongly 
suggest that non-democracies tend to have significantly higher variation in growth over the periods from 1972-
2009 (FH) and 1960-2009 (Polity).  
7 See also Rodrik (1997, 1999). Sah(1991) broadens this argument to claim that autocracies’ performance should 
be more variable than the performance of the democracies, due to human fallibility. In societies where only a 
small group of people are responsible for the most relevant decisions, risk in decision-making is not well 
diversified.  
   5
endogeneity of the measures. Kormendi and Meguire (1985) also estimated with OLS using a 
Gastil dummy for 47 countries for the period from 1950 to 1977. They – as well as March 
(1988) using a larger sample - found no relationship between the two variables. Grier and 
Tullock (1989) also used OLS with the Gastil measure of democracy with a sample of 89 
developing countries and ran separate regressions for Africa, Asia and the Americas. They 
used a pooled cross section time series (5 year averages) and found a negative relationship 
for Africa and no relationship for the Americas or Asia. Barro (1996) was the first to try and 
address the endogeneity issue through use of instruments, mainly lagged values. Relating 
growth rates of real per capita GDP over three periods to the Gastil measure of political 
rights, he found a negative but insignificant relationship between democracy and growth. 
However, he also found evidence for an inverted U curve relationship between democracy 
and growth. To test for non-linearities, dummy variables for democracy were used, 
corresponding to low, medium and high, as indicated by the Gastil measure. The findings 
appeared to reject linearity with a middle level of democracy being most tightly associated 
with performance. A similar conclusion held when entering the democracy indicator in 
quadratic form, with higher levels of political freedom being associated with worse 
performance. This was attributed to the impact of redistribution. Although using 
instruments, the paper did not take into account unobserved heterogeneity or fixed effects. 
Barro and Lee (1993) also used data for the period from 1973 to 1985 for a large sample of 
countries and found no relationship between democracy and growth. Other papers, such as 
Levine and Renelt (1992) and De Haan and Siermann (1995) have also used the Gastil index 
but found no robust relationship between the measure and performance.    
We now revisit the relationship between political system – principally democracy – 
and growth using 5 year averages for a large sample of 159 developed, developing and 
transition economies over the period from 1960 to 2009. We opt for a gradient measure of 
democracy as we are trying to estimate the impact of regimes on growth in the longer period 
(rather than analyzing the impact of transitional democratizations). As such, we use several 
measures of democracy. The first is the Freedom House index measure of civil liberties and 
political rights. This index assigns the countries a specific score corresponding to their level 
of political rights and civil liberties in the country (1 being most democratic and 7 being the 
least democratic). We also derive a variable democracy which is a simple average of political 
rights and civil liberties. A second measure is also applied using the democracy data taken   6
from Polity IV. That dataset also offers a gradient approach to measuring the level of 
democracy, ranking countries on a spectrum ranging from fully institutionalized autocracies 
through mixed or incoherent autocratic regimes to fully institutionalized democracies. The 
nature of each regime is measured on a 20 point scale ranging from -10 (full autocracy) to 
+10 (full democracy)
8. It should be noted however that the definition of democracy in Polity 
IV is narrower than the Freedom House Index
9.  We also use the Cheibub dataset in which a 
dummy variable is used for when a country is deemed democratic
10. As a robustness check - 
we also experiment with a measure of the duration of regimes (also taken from Polity IV 
dataset) conditional on whether a country has been a democracy or an autocracy
11. 
We implement the following:  
 
y/li,t= α + β DEMOCRACYi,t + γX i,t + ε i,t 
 
where, X is a vector of control variables (the level of economic development, openness, 
inflation, gross secondary education enrollment rate, life expectancy, population and 
government expenditure
12).  
We adopt state-of-the-art Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation to 
deal with the critical issues of endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity
13. Tables 1 and 2 
report our estimations when growth in per capita income and real GDP growth are our 
dependent variables. It can be seen that in no instance do any of the reported right hand 
sides have significance.   Model 1 uses a Freedom House average of the civil liberties and 
political rights. The scale of the index is inverted, increasing in the degree of autocracy. The 
                                                 
8 Note we also transform the Polity IV variable by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score 
(also adding 10) thus arriving at a gradient measure of democracy that ranges from 0 to 20 (0 being perfectly 
autocratic and 20 being perfectly democratic). 
9 Unlike the Freedom House Index that focuses on both political right and civil liberties, Polity IV consists of 
six component measures that record key qualities of executive recruitment, constraints on the executive 
authority and political competition.  
10 To be democratic the following conditions need to be satisfied: (a) direct election of the executive either by 
popular vote or election of committed delegates; (b) legislature is elected by either direct or indirect election, (c) 
multiple parties are legally present, (d) de facto, there are multiple parties in the political system, (e), multiple 
parties are represented in the legislature and (f) incumbents do not usurp power while in office.  
11 It is also worth noting that we experimented with ICRG as a possible measure of democracy. However, 
ICRG measures are focused mostly on measuring policy outcomes rather than institutions and some of the 
credit risk scores could be biased. 
12 Data for per capita GDP growth comes from the World Penn Tables. Data for real GDP growth are taken 
from the World Development Indicators (WDI). Most controls are also drawn from the WDI, although the 
inflation measure is from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. 
13 Roodman (2008) provides discussion of the assumptions underlying GMM with panel data   7
coefficient of the estimation is positive suggesting a negative link between democracy and 
growth (i.e. countries with worse civil liberties and political rights tend to grow more). 
However, the coefficient is insignificant. Model 2 estimates in non-linear form and suggests 
that at lower levels of democracy an increase in political rights and civil liberties may increase 
growth (similar to Barro). In Model 3 Polity IV is used in linear form and the estimate 
suggests that an increase in democracy will be associated with growth. In non-linear forms, 
the results are ambiguous. Models 5 and 6 use a slightly transformed index - adding 10 
points in order to arrive at a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 20 - and these suggest 
that in the linear specification per capita growth increases with democracy. In the non-linear 
form, it suggests that there is a threshold beyond which this positive association holds. We 
also explore using a measure of durability, conditional upon the nature of the regime, in 
Models 7 and 8. The sign switches across estimates and both are insignificant. Model 9 uses 
the Cheibub measure – the coefficient is positive, implying that more democracy is 
associated with per capita growth - but it is insignificant. Finally, Model 10 includes the 
Polity variable as well as an interaction between that measure and durability. Both 
coefficients are positive but insignificant. Table 2 repeats using real GDP growth as the 
dependent variable. The same results broadly hold.  
In order to assess the sensitivity of our results to different estimation techniques, we 
also estimate the same equations using OLS and panel fixed effects. No robust association 
between democracy and institutions - whether estimating with per capita growth or GDP 
growth as the dependent variable - can be established. Indeed, none of the main explanatory 
variables has any statistical significance
14     
In sum, our efforts to identify an association between political regime – notably 
democracy - and growth can find no such association. Further, given that earlier estimates 
that did find such a link used biased estimation techniques, we consider that our results 
represent a more reliable indicator. We return to the possible reasons for why these estimates 
are so inconclusive in Section 5 below.    
 
3. Institutions and performance at country level 
Centre-stage in the policy dialogue of recent times has been the proposition that the 
institutional texture of a country crucially affects how business and investment are done. 
                                                 
14 Results are available on request.   8
Business environments that have lower regulation, higher predictability and greater 
transparency have generally been regarded as being supportive for growth. There is now a 
very copious literature trying to establish this argument across a great number of countries 
and periods of time
15. In addition, these basic propositions have entered the policy canon 
and characteristically form a part of the dialogue between developing countries and external 
lenders. While there are now a number of data sources that attempt to document country 
level business environments, the most notable remains the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business’ 
survey. Doing Business employs a template questionnaire targeted at local professionals in a 
variety of fields, including lawyers, officials and consultants. The questionnaire is organised 
around a hypothetical business case and then administered to a range of expert respondents 
in each country. It has now been administered up to seven times between 2003 and 2009 
with over 5000 experts being contacted in 175 countries. In recent years, information on ten 
indicators has been collected
16. However, information on only five sets of indicators has 
been collected for all years since 2003
17. The full set of Doing Business indicators are also 
put together in an aggregate ranking that aims to summarise a country’s ease of doing 
business. It should be noted that each country has a unique indicator, a heroic assumption 
for large and diverse countries, such as Brazil or India. A number of quite restrictive 
assumptions are also made about the representative firm
18.  
The philosophy behind Doing Business has causality running from institutions to 
performance. Identifying these effects raises obvious issues of endogeneity. Performance can 
obviously be summarised by country level growth but data limitations mean that, at best, 
only the relationship between growth over the period 2003-2007 and the Doing Business 
indicators available for 2003 could be explored. But looking at the growth rate over a very 
short period of time that could have been affected by business cycles is problematic. The 
impact of institutions on growth is far more likely to be a longer term phenomenon and 
might not affect performance immediately. Further, it would not be possible to address the 
issues arising from potential reverse causality due to the absence of suitable instruments. The 
countries that have a potential to grow faster may have had more incentives to develop 
                                                 
15 See, for example, Dollar et al (2005), Loayza et al (2004), De Soto (2000) 
16 Namely, starting a business; employment regulation; enforcing contracts; getting credit; closing a business; 
registering property; protecting investors; dealing with licenses; paying taxes and trading across borders. 
17 Starting a business, employment regulation; enforcing contracts; getting credit and closing a business. 
18 See Commander and Tinn (2009) for more detail.   9
institutions. This limits the robustness of any estimation using aggregate data. However, 
there are also hypothesised relationships between the Doing Business indicators and, what 
can be termed, intermediate outcomes. These are indicated in Table 3. What we now do is to 
relate recent available data on the intermediate indicators to the contemporaneous Doing 
Business indicators. The estimates also use as controls the log of PPP adjusted GDP, 
government expenditure to GDP and secondary school enrolment. These results are 
reported in Table 4. The results in the first column include only one relevant group of Doing 
Business indicators. The second column reports results when Doing Business indicators 
from all relevant categories are jointly included. Exceptions are stock market capitalisation 
and the stock turnover ratio where the second column gives the impact of the overall 
investor protection index and first column gives the impact of subcomponents of the 
investor protection index individually.  
           Table 4 shows that there are some - but very few - statistically significant associations. 
Better legal rights are positively associated with private credit, capital inflows and FDI. 
However, these relationships are absent for private bank credit, where it might have been 
expected to be stronger than with the broader measure of private credit. Legal rights are also 
found not to be associated with higher investment. Better private and public registry 
coverage appears to be positively associated with higher private credit and private registries 
with private bank credit when only the ‘Getting Credit’ indicators are included. However, the 
significance disappears when all potentially relevant indicators are included in the regression. 
The same applies for the recovery rate when closing a business and bank credit, as well as for 
procedures for registering property and enforcing contracts and the broader private credit 
measure. Better investor protection is associated with higher stock market capitalization but 
not with stock market liquidity as measured by the stock market turnover ratio. Note that it 
is hard to argue that the causality of these statistically significant relationships runs from 
institutions to better credit and stock market development, as the development of these 
markets will have naturally created a need for better regulation. Other relationships appear 
even weaker. For example, there are no significant and predictably signed associations with 
registering property indicators and construction, export and import with the trading across 
borders indicators, informal economy and starting business, employing workers and 
enforcing contracts and unemployment with employment indicators. Investment is unrelated   10
to most Doing Business indicators, while there is a weak association with procedures to deal 
with licences and enforcing contracts.  
 
4. Institutions and performance at firm level 
Moving beyond country level aggregates a parallel strand of analysis is to relate firm level 
measures of performance to institutional measures. In this section, we use firm level data 
collected by the World Bank using 135 surveys in over 70 countries between 1999 and 2005. 
These data include the Productivity and Investment Climate Surveys as well as the Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance (BEEPS) surveys that cover the transition 
countries. While these data have themselves collected measures of institutions, they also 
contain information on a common measure of performance, namely on the level of, and 
change in, sales per worker or labour productivity. It is this measure of performance that we 
use initially and relate to the Doing Business indicators. Later using the BEEPS, we also 
bring in the surveys’ own institutional measures.   
Using the Doing Business indicators has the problem of limited data points and 
potential reverse causality. Yet, using firm level responses for the left hand side performance 
measure and Doing Business indicators as explanatory variables – where such indicators as 
averages could be viewed as exogenous to the firm – may be an appropriate identification 
strategy. However, we are forced to use past measures of performance against current 
measures of constraints. In that sense, the estimate is clearly mis-specified. However, given 
that we would not expect too many changes in the Doing Business indicators over the 
reference period, this may not be that serious a problem. Moreover, at this point the aim of 
the exercise has been less to deal with possible issues of biased estimates, than to see 
whether indeed there is any simple association between performance and the institutional 
indicators.  
Table 5 reports the results. Estimation is by Ordinary Least Squares with controls for 
industry, firm size (small, medium, large), majority ownership (domestic private, foreign, 
state), age (less than 5, 5 to 10 and more than 10 years) and the shares of workers with 
secondary education in the firm (the baseline case). We additionally run the regressions by 
adding lagged log PPP adjusted GDP per capita to control for the general development level   11
of the country
19. The Doing Business indicators are individually entered and in the last two 
columns, jointly. The performance equations are separately estimated for the different 
income groups. Coefficients with the predicted sign and significant at a 5% or higher level 
are indicated in bold type.  
While there is some evidence that when entered individually some of the Doing 
Business indicators have the predicted sign and significance, it is striking that this is mainly 
true for the high and upper middle income group. Further, a number of coefficients lose 
significance when the controls for income per capita are included. This is particularly true for 
the lower middle income countries. Turning to the case where the indicators are entered 
jointly, variables often switch signs or lose significance altogether. A number of the signs are 
perverse. The estimates including the income per capita control perform better than the base 
specification for the low income group.
20  
What can be concluded from this set of estimations using the large World Bank firm 
survey dataset? The most obvious finding is that the Doing Business constraints are 
relatively weak and unstable predictors of firm level performance.  Further, we have also 
experimented with relating other outcome measures selectively to the Doing Business 
indicators. For example, we used the firm dataset to relate a variable summarising the share 
of loans given as collateral to the getting credit and enforcing contracts variables from Doing 
Business. We have also related whether a firm has developed a new product line or 
introduced new technology to the getting credit measures, as well as the protecting investor 
variables. This was done one at a time and then jointly.  In the great majority of instances, 
we found no significant association and, in many cases, the sign switched when shifting from 
individual to joint estimation
21. 
  So far, the analysis has simply extracted the performance measure from the survey 
evidence. At this point, we shift from relying on the Doing Business institutional measures 
to those generated by the surveys themselves and by the BEEPS, in particular. This dataset 
covers 26 transition economies in Europe and the former Soviet Union with four full rounds 
of sampling in 1999, 2002, 2005 and 2009 of which the last three are used in our analysis.  
                                                 
19 Adding lagged GDP per capita serves as a proxy for features of the business environment that are not 
incorporated in the Doing Business indicators. Obvious problems from potential endogeneity arise.  
20 Note that when adding alternative measures of the business environment, such as, the ‘Rule of Law’ measure 
in Kaufmann, Kraay, Mastruzzy (2006), the explanatory power of the Doing Business indicators decreased 
further. 
21 Results are available on request.   12
The 2002 round of the BEEPS surveyed some 6,100 firms, the 2005 round covered nearly 
9,100 firms and the 2009 round over 7800 firms in the same countries. Around 90 per cent 
of the BEEPS samples comprised small and medium enterprises. Most firms had been 
privatized or were always private. Mean firm size in employment ranged between 105 and 
143, while, on average, exports comprised around 10% of total sales. With respect to the 
business environment, each firm’s top manager was asked to provide their perception of the 
constraints ranking from 1-4. Table 6 indicates average scores in the three years. Tax rates, 
corruption and cost of financing were viewed as significant obstacles in all periods with the 
average score being in the range of 2.3-2.7. However, there was large variation in mean 
values across perceived constraints - standard deviations were large, although declining in 
2009.  
Our approach is to analyze the determinants of the efficiency with which the firms 
generate sales revenue from inputs
22. This is done by estimating an augmented Cobb 
Douglas revenue function where efficiency is allowed to vary across institutional and 
structural variables, industries and countries. The aim, in particular, is to see whether the 
constraints variables help to explain differences in efficiency. In keeping with much of the 
literature, we start by using OLS without controlling for country and sector fixed effects. A 
dummy for the type of privatization is introduced. The constraints variables were based on 
responses by all other firms in a given industry in each country and year. Without the sector 
and country controls and in common with some of the existing literature, we find that when 
entered individually many, if not the majority, of the constraints terms enter significantly and 
predictably, i.e., negatively signed. However, entering these terms individually raises an 
obvious issue of omitted variables, so we have re-estimated entering the constraints terms 
jointly. When that is done, a number of constraints variables lose significance in all cross-
sections
23. In 2002 and 2005 the majority of constraints remain significant, while in 2009 
only two stay significant when entered jointly. The constraints variables that remain 
significant vary across each of the years.  
Estimating without controlling for sector and country is also likely to lead to biased 
estimates. Table 7 reports the results of estimating when these controls are applied. Using the 
2002 data it can be seen that when entered separately four of the constraints terms are signed 
                                                 
22 This is the broad approach taken in Commander and Svejnar (2011) 
23 These results are available on request from the authors   13
significantly and negatively, as would be predicted. When entered all together only two of the 
variables are significant while one – customs and foreign trade regulations – is positive and 
significant. For the 2005 sample only one of the constraints terms is negatively signed and 
significant when entered either individually or jointly. In some instances, constraints enter 
positively and significantly. Finally, in the 2009 cross-section none of the individually entered 
constraints has the predicted sign and significance; in the joint estimation that was true only 
for the cost of financing.   
There are, however, obvious drawbacks with OLS, not least potential endogeneity or 
selection issues relating to some of the explanatory variables. To counter this, we employ 
instrumental variables. Unfortunately, this is only possible for the 2002 and 2005 rounds as 
changes in the survey design and reference periods collected in the 2009 round meant that 
we were unable to apply a common set of instruments. Using the 2002 and 2005 cross-
sections, we adopt a two stage approach where the first stage involves estimation in levels 
with revenue being related to factors, ownership, competition and export exposure. The IVs 
used for the levels of the capital and labour inputs, categories of ownership and the export 
orientation of the firm were the age of the firm, the skill ratio interacted with the three main 
regions covered by the data, the skill ratio interacted with firm age and the three regions, a 
three-year lag of full time employees, the change in fixed assets in the preceding three years, 
and the change in the export share over the preceding three years. These IVs were found to 
be good predictors of all the potentially endogenous variables and passed the J over-
identification test (see Table 8). The extent of competition in the firm’s product market was 
taken to be exogenous.  
The second stage was to consider directly the impact of business environment 
constraints on firm performance. An average value of each constraint was used.  When 
entered individually, only one of the constraints entered negatively and significantly for 2002 
and 2005 and these were actually different constraints across the two years. When entered 
jointly only the infrastructure constraint was negative and significant in 2005. In short, in a 
specification with instrumentation and including country and sector fixed effects almost all 
of the constraint terms were insignificant and/or incorrectly signed
24.  
                                                 
24 Commander and Svejnar (2011) merged the BEEPS firm-level data with the Doing Business indicators. 
When entering the Doing Business indicators individually into similar IV regressions using pooled data and in a 
specification with country, industry and year fixed effects, only four of the twelve indicators generated the 
expected negative coefficients. In the IV regressions without fixed effects, only two of the twelve indicators   14
In sum, applying a careful analysis to a large and well-used dataset – the BEEPs - we 
find that the measures of the business/institutional environment do not support a strong, 
negative relationship between constraints and firm performance.  
 
5. Why is so little explained? 
5.1 Political systems and performance 
Limitations in measurement appear to be part of the answer. Most measures of political 
systems construct indices, commonly on a 0-10 scale or just binary, based on procedures and 
laws. These narrow procedural definitions obviously ignore any outcome dimensions, yet it 
is indicators, such as accountability, equality and/or civil rights, that are likely to be 
important in explaining performance. Lindert (2002) has argued that taxonomies of political 
regimes commonly ignore large differences in the share of adults who have any real voice. 
For example, Polity IVs’ index rates the USA as a full democracy pre-1939, yet this skirts the 
fact that blacks were effectively disenfranchised and certainly devoid of real political voice.  
Further criticism has focused on the way in which the main measures classify regimes on the 
basis of the central government alone. Yet, particularly in large countries, decentralized 
power and decision making has become increasingly important. Most the institutional 
indexes used are ordinal, thereby ranking countries on some criterion without specifying the 
degree of difference between countries. As such, for the purpose of growth regressions, 
ordinal indices need to be transformed into cardinal ones
25. Yet, there is no reason to pre-
suppose that such a transformation should be one-for-one: for instance, the difference in the 
quality of the judiciary in the USA and South Africa may be much smaller than that between 
South Africa and Zaire, even though the same differential is measured on an ordinal scale of 
1 to 10. In principle, such nonlinearities can be addressed by including non-linear terms for 
the independent variable. A further criticism concerns the way in which different 
components of many of the indexes are aggregated
26. Typically, components are simply 
added up or averaged with the same weights. With many components, factor analysis that 
aggregates components with unknown weights would be superior.  
                                                                                                                                                 
had negative effects. Moreover, the indicators with the negative coefficients were not the same across 
specifications. 
25 A point made by Barro (1996) 
26 Aron (2000)   15
While measurement is likely to be part of the problem, it is also clear that there can 
be different, and sometimes opposing, mechanisms through which democracy has an impact 
on growth. For example, Tavares and Wacziarg (2001) examine the importance of different 
transmission mechanisms and find that democracy can foster growth by raising educational 
attainments but that, under certain assumptions, it can act differently on growth by affecting 
the rate of physical capital accumulation. Alesina et al (1996) focus on political instability and 
its consequences for efficiency and growth. They do not explicitly deal with the issue of 
whether instability is a product of a particular type of political system, but are able to show 
that in countries where instability is greater, growth tends to be lower but that there is no 
significant difference between authoritarian and democratic regimes. Other papers cited 
above – notably those by Mancur Olson – have also suggested that it may be factors such as 
longevity and credibility of governments that may best explain performance. And while 
credibility and stability may tend to be greater under democracy, this has not necessarily been 
the case.  With similar ambiguity, Acemoglu (2007) argues that higher democracy tends to be 
good for growth because it reduces the extent to which existing oligarchies can prevent entry 
by potential competitors. On the other hand, democracy also tends to lead to higher tax 
rates in equilibrium, which in turn tends to discourage innovation, ceteris paribus. In short, 
the inability to bolt down a tight, robust relationship between political system and 
performance may be as much to do with the inability of such an approach to pin down the 
underlying complexities and non-linearities. Expressed differently, we are probably asking far 
too much. 
 
5.2 Country and firm performance 
Our analysis has found that neither at country nor firm level do widely used measures of the 
business environment appear to have significant explanatory power when relating constraints 
to performance, particularly when paying careful attention to issues of endogeneity.  As in 
the discussion of political systems, potential explanations have several dimensions and can, 
perhaps, best be grouped into four broad categories. The first is that the various indicators 
may simply be mis-measured. The second is that the indicators may be incomplete and/or 
too specific. The third is that the underlying relationships may be more complex and the 
fourth is that the identification strategy may be flawed.    16
With respect to measurement, a starting point is to ask whether firm and country 
level measures of obstacles actually give broadly consistent responses. Commander and Tinn 
(2009) use firm level evidence from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys dataset containing 
over 30,000 firm level observations for at least 75 countries relating to the period from 1999-
2006 and relate responses in these firm level surveys to the Doing Business indicators that 
are their closest match.  They find that there is no tight association between firm level survey 
responses and the Doing Business measures. To understand why this might be the case, it is 
useful to look in more detail at the firm level evidence from the surveys. What emerges is 
that there is large variation in responses, particularly with respect to variation within 
countries. Further, there is more variation within-industry than between-industry
27, 
suggesting much variation in subjective responses. Given that the attributes of individual 
respondents’ cannot be controlled for, this variation is hard to explain. Clearly, subjective 
evaluations raise questions regarding possible bias
28.  What is less clear is whether one or 
other of the measures is superior in the measurement of constraints. At this point, all that 
can be said is that there are major discrepancies between the two approaches that are 
difficult to understand, let alone explain. Any mis-measurement might come from either 
source
29.  
With respect to the country level indicators in Doing Business, the objective of 
looking at an average representative firm is likely to be problematic. First, there is the issue 
of how a representative business is defined. Second, focusing on an average firm obviously 
ignores heterogeneity among firms as well as sectoral specialisation in a country. The higher 
correlation of the Doing Business indicators observed in high income countries might 
suggest that the templates are best designed for a representative firm in a high income 
country. If firms in less developed countries are engaged in substantially different production 
activities, the constraints they face are likely to be very different.  
Similar sample selection issues are likely to affect the responses of firms more 
generally. If there are many obstacles in the business environment, only agents with the best 
                                                 
27 There are no obvious patterns when controlling for the size of firm or ownership. 
28 Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) 
29 Commander and Tinn (2009) also examine in detail the properties of the Doing Business indicators. Looking 
at the correlation between the different indicators collected in Doing Business, they find almost no correlation. 
While this absence could support the view that each is providing unique information, it is hard intuitively to 
understand why this is the case. One possibility is that the indicators are measuring unrelated phenomena, 
although this seems implausible. It also implies that a change in one indicator would not necessarily have an 
impact on others.    17
entrepreneurial and/or managerial talent may be active. Further, it is unclear what 
entrepreneurial or managerial talent actually means in a poor business environment. For 
example, it may be that these entrepreneurs have the best ability for dealing with corruption 
rather than being the most dynamic in other more productive areas. Such issues are likely to 
create bias in firm responses. 
Both the Doing Business indicators and firm level responses are ultimately 
subjective. Responses can be affected by the mood and personality of the respondent as well 
as by respondents adapting to the business environment. While the first effect is likely to 
average out in the firm level surveys, it does not necessarily average out in a small number of 
expert opinions, as in Doing Business. To the extent that questions in Doing Business are 
more objective by trying to measure constraints more specifically – such as the time to 
enforce contracts – they may suffer from less possible bias than firm level surveys. The issue 
of adaptation is clearly a problem when evaluating the business environment using firm level 
subjective responses. In this instance, it will not average out irrespective of the number of 
responses.  
Additional explanations for the lack of explanatory power could be that the variables 
and indicators that are collected are too specific. Take the example of credit and enforcing 
contracts. The theoretical literature often models this as the probability of avoiding 
repayment to the creditor
30. There is no direct measure of this in the Doing Business 
indicators, while there are several proxies such as the time, procedures and cost of enforcing 
contracts. There are also important variables and indicators missing in both firm and country 
level surveys. For example, R&D and technology adoption are likely to be major sources of 
growth and incentives to innovate are likely to be affected by intellectual property rights
31. 
The incompleteness of the existing measures – as with Doing Business - is likely to be a 
problem.  
There is also the broader question as to the validity of the assumption of a 
monotonic relationship between country level indicators and economic performance. For 
example, the correlation of the Doing Business indicators with GDP and with several 
intermediate outcomes appears to decline with income
32. This result is not surprising. For 
                                                 
30 For example, Hart and Moore, 1994, Marimon and Quadrini 2006, Aghion et al., 2003 
31 Parente and Prescott, 1994 
32 Commander and Tinn (2008)   18
example, investor protection is likely to be important in countries that have formal equity 
markets. In the absence of these markets, differences in minority shareholder protection are 
unlikely to affect performance. Another example concerns the substantial differences in the 
availability of skilled labour among countries. The technology that is appropriate in countries 
that are abundant in skilled labour may not be appropriate in countries that are not
33. As a 
result, the constraints to productive activity in high versus low income countries may be 
different depending on the availability of skilled labour. This suggests the presence of 
thresholds of income per capita or other indicators, such as labour force or size of equity 
markets, at which constraints will matter or not. 
Finally, there is the issue of the identification strategy. In the context of firm level 
evidence, Carlin et al (2006) argue that the parameter estimates from an equation relating a 
measure of performance to particular constraints can be biased for several reasons. The first 
is that many of the measures of constraints that have been collected may in fact be more in 
the nature of public goods that are an input into private production. As such, the issue of the 
endogeneity of public good supply will exist, as better performing countries will generally 
have better levels of supply. Second, with respect to the demand for public goods, better 
performing firms will tend to demand better public goods provision. In other words, there 
may be a problem of reverse causality
34. However, when an instrumental variables approach 
has been used in order to avoid these pitfalls, we have been unable to find robust evidence 
of constraints having an impact on performance.  
 
6. Conclusion 
A broad consensus appears now to exist concerning the importance of institutions for 
economic performance. Our paper has taken a close look at this proposition by focusing on 
three, related questions. The first concerned whether the type of political system, and its 
associated institutions, tends to affect performance. The simple conjecture, drawn from a 
significant literature, was that democracy in particular has features that should be 
encouraging for performance, even if that underlying relationship was not linear. This was 
addressed using several sets of country level measures of political institutions and through 
                                                 
33 Acemoglu, 2002 
34 More generally, in firm surveys the information on performance and constraints are raised simultaneously 
which can create problems.  
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use of leading edge GMM estimation. The second concerned the impact of institutions 
connected to the investment and business environment on the performance of countries, 
irrespective of their political configuration. In particular, this part of the analysis focused on 
a widely cited measure of the business environment that covers 175 countries; the World 
Bank’s Doing Business. The third question was to ask whether the evidence could robustly 
support the broad proposition that the performance of firms’ could be materially influenced 
by the business environment. This required, above all, econometric implementation able to 
address the pervasive problems of endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity. 
  The results reported in the paper are ambiguous, if not hostile, to the default 
proposition of institutions affecting performance. In the case of political institutions, none 
of the explanatory variables was significant. For country level analysis we were limited by an 
absence of an adequate number of observations on time. But the analysis that we were able 
to implement indicates that no robust conclusions can be drawn. In the case of firm level 
analysis, using a large two-period dataset on twenty six transition countries – countries 
whose initial conditions comprised largely similar institutional formats – we were unable to 
find any strong relationship between revenues and the institutional constraints. Country 
effects that captured other sources of cross-country heterogeneity were found to matter for 
performance.  
  Finally, the paper addressed why these exercises have yielded a relatively meagre 
harvest, at least when held up against the prevailing orthodoxy.  Put simply, it would appear 
that issues of measurement – including bias arising from subjective evaluation – mis-
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Cross-National analysis”, Kyklos, 36, 21-39.Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Democracy (Freedom House) .019 (.263)  -1.568 (1.366)
Democracy (Freedom House) squared .206 (.172)
Polity  .053 (.081) .023 (.076) .046 (.072) .045 (.071)
Polity sqaured .009 (.012)
Polity (transformed) .052 (.082)  -.212 (.289)
Polity transformed (squared) .011 (.012)
Regime durability   -.004 (.020) .001 (.019)
Democracy (Cheibub) .432 (.667)
Interaction between Polity and durability .0008 (.001)
Number of observations 669 669 667 667 667 667 669 667 669 667
Number of groups 141 141 140 140 140 140 141 140 141 140
Number of instruments 112 128 112 128 112 128 112 128 112 112
Hansen test 0.214 0.296 0.204 0.357 0.190 0.369 0.18 0.179 0.19 0.162
AR(2) 0.793 0.402 0.843 0.423 0.836 0.404 0.734 0.796 0.412 0.512
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Democracy (Freedom House) .235 (.213)  -.297 (1.067)
Democracy (Freedom House) squared .068 (.136)
Polity   -.011 (.055)  -.039 (.052) .011 (.050) .010 (.054)
Polity squared .003 (.010)
Polity (transformed)  -.008 (.056)  -.132 (.254)
Polity (transformed) squared .004 (.011)
Regime durability   -.008 (.017)   -.005 (.016)
Democracy (Cheibub)  -.308 (.800)
Interaction between Polity and durability .0002 (.001)
Number of observations 661 661 659 650 659 659 661 659 660 659
Number of groups 141 141 140 140 140 140 141 140 140 140
Number of instruments 112 128 112 128 112 128 112 128 112 112
Hansen test 0.14 0.196 0.137 0.224 0.107 0.176 0.203 0.34 0.135 0.176
AR(2) 0.698 0.929 0.661 0.923 0.669 0.954 0.775 0.842 0.76 0.763
Table 1. GMM regression results while using GDP per capita growth as a dependent variable
Table 2. GMM regression results while using real GDP growth as a dependant variable
In addition to the main independent variables, the following control variables are used: lagged value of the GDP per capita growth, log of the real GDP per capita (PPP), trade openness, inflation, life expectancy, population, gross secondary school enrollment and government expenditure. The sign, magnitude and the significance of the 
control variables correspond to the ones used in the empirical literature. *** denotes significance at 1 percent level of significance,
In addition to the main independent variables, the following control variables are used: lagged value of the GDP per capita growth, log of the real GDP per capita (PPP), trade openness, inflation, life expectancy, population, gross secondary school enrollment and government expenditure. The sign, magnitude and the significance of the 
control variables correspond to the ones used in the empirical literature. *** denotes significance at 1 percent level of significance,Table 3: Doing Business indicators and intermediate outcomes  
– hypothesised relationships 
Indicator  Intermediate outcome and expected sign of the relationship 
Constraints 




Firm creation (-) 
Investments (-) 
Job creation (-) 
Informal economy (+) 
Corruption (+) 
Efficiency of production (-) 





Construction sector (-) 
Cheaper offices (-) 
Cheaper warehouses (-) 
Informal economy (+) 







Informal economy (+) 
Business costs (+) 
Adj. to new technologies (-) 
Adj. to macroeconomic shocks   
(-) 
Adj. to migrant inflows (-) 






Property rights (-) 









Non-performing loans (-) 
Investment (+) 









Size of stock market (+) 
Constraints 
in paying 
Informal economy (+) 
Quality of public services (-) 
Government revenue (-) 
















Bank credit (-) 
Interest rates (+) 
Entry of new firms (-) 
Employment (-) 
Government expenditures (+) 
Integrity of court system (-) 
Constraints 








Job creation (-) 
Source: Commander and Tinn (2008)  
   28
Table 4: Intermediate outcomes and Doing Business indicators 
Left hand side variables and DB indicators 
Regressions with 
one DB indicator 
category included 
Regressions with 
all relevant DB 
indicators jointly 
entered 
•  Private credit to GDP 
Dealing with licences: procedures  -0.495  0.031 
Dealing with licences: time  -0.073  -0.016 
Dealing with licences: cost  0.002  0.001 
Getting credit: legal rights  5.020** 5.077* 
Getting credit: credit information  -0.034  0.720 
Getting credit: public registries  0.631*  0.442 
Getting credit: private registries  0.527**  0.236 
Registering property: procedures  -3.337**  -1.386 
Registering property: time  -0.079  -0.063 
Registering property: cost  1.732**  1.060 
Enforcing contracts: procedures  -0.729*  -0.090 
Enforcing contracts: time  -0.002  0.005 
Enforcing contracts: cost  0.077  0.032 
Closing business: time  1.475  -0.372 
Closing business: cost  0.522  0.272 
Closing business: recovery rate  1.135  0.527 
•  Private bank credit to GDP 
Dealing with licences: procedures  -0.885  -0.585 
Dealing with licences: time  -0.089  -0.084 
Dealing with licences: cost  0.002  0.004 
Getting credit: legal rights  3.443  5.122 
Getting credit: credit information  0.229  0.555 
Getting credit: public registries  0.675  0.530 
Getting credit: private registries  0.488**  0.247   29
Table 4 (cont’d). Intermediate outcomes and Doing Business indicators 
Left hand side variables and DB indicators 
Regressions with 
one DB indicator 
category included 
Regressions with 
all relevant DB 
indicators jointly 
entered 
Registering property: procedures  -1.771  0.252 
Registering property: time  -0.102  -0.070 
Registering property: cost  1.648*  1.355 
•  Private credit to GDP 
Enforcing contracts: procedures  -0.691  -0.031 
Enforcing contracts: time  0.006  0.024 
Enforcing contracts: cost  0.098  0.186 
Closing business: time  1.533  -0.404 
Closing business: cost  0.505  0.133 
Closing business: recovery rate  1.097**  0.467 
•  Construction to GDP 
Registering property: procedures  0.162   
Registering property: time  0.008   
Registering property: cost  -0.007   
•  Gross fixed capital formation to GDP 
Dealing with licences: procedures  -0.214**  -0.171 
Dealing with licences: time  -0.008  -0.011 
Dealing with licences: cost  -0.001  -0.001 
Getting credit: legal rights  0.143  -0.072 
Getting credit: credit information  -0.461  -0.655 
Getting credit: public registries  0.023  0.001 
Getting credit: private registries  -0.027  -0.027 
Registering property: procedures  0.204  0.018 
Registering property: time  0.000  -0.005 
Registering property: cost  -0.089  0.039   30
Enforcing contracts: procedures  -0.104*  -0.103 
Enforcing contracts: time  0.000  0.001 
Enforcing contracts: cost  -0.031  -0.021 
Protecting investors: investor protection  -0.201  -0.035 
•  Gross private capital flows to GDP 
Getting credit: legal rights  13.920** 12.740** 
Enforcing contracts: procedures  -0.972  -0.391 
Enforcing contracts: time  -0.025  -0.013 
Enforcing contracts: cost  0.038  0.054 
•  Net foreign direct investments to GDP 
Getting credit: legal rights  1.037** 1.034** 
Enforcing contracts: procedures  -0.039  -0.012 
Enforcing contracts: time  -0.002  -0.001 
Enforcing contracts: cost  -0.016  -0.020 
 
•  Export to GDP 
Trading across borders: documents export  -0.922   
Trading across borders: time export  0.082   
•  Import to GDP 
Trading across borders: documents import  -0.509   
Trading across borders: time import  -0.135   
•  Stock market capitalization to GDP 
Protecting investors: disclosure  7.579**   
Protecting investors: director liability  14.024**   
Protecting investors: shareholder suits  -0.046   
Protecting investors: investor protection    21.757** 
•  Stock market turnover ratio 
Protecting investors: disclosure  0.823   
Protecting investors: director liability  5.643   
Protecting investors: shareholder suits  -2.406     31
Protecting investors: investor protection    3.417 
•  Size of informal economy 
Starting business: procedures  0.888*  0.690 
Starting business: time  -0.012  0.034 
Starting business: cost  -0.028  -0.034 
Employing workers: rigidity  0.059  0.087 
Employing workers: non-wage cost  0.069  0.005 
Employing workers: firing cost  0.002  -0.024 
Enforcing contracts: procedures  0.049  -0.011 
Enforcing contracts: time  0.004  0.003 
Enforcing contracts: cost  -0.071  -0.089 
•  Size of informal economy 
Employing workers: rigidity  0.069   
Employing workers: firing cost  0.016   
Note: The coefficients marked bold and with “*” indicate statistical significance at 10% level and with “**”  
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Table 5: Growth in firm level sales per worker and Doing Business indicators  









•  All countries 
Starting business: time  ..  ..  -0.112  -0.124 
Dealing with licences: time  ..  ..  0.043  0.037 
Employing workers: rigidity employment  ..  ..  ..  .. 
Registering property: time  -0.039 -0.053  .. .. 
Getting credit: legal rights index  1.178  1.158  .. .. 
Protecting investors: investor protection  ..  ..  .. .. 
Paying taxes: time  0.002  0.002 .. 0.006 
Trading across borders: time export  0.282  0.309  0.442 0.399 
Enforcing contracts: time  -0.011 -0.012 -0.014  -0.013 
Closing business: time  ..  ..  ..  .. 
 
•  High and upper middle income countries 
Starting business: time  -0.260 -0.237    
Dealing with licences: time  0.128  0.113  0.280  0.433 
Employing workers: rigidity employment  0.454  0.406  0.380   
Registering property: time  -0.420  ..    
Getting credit: legal rights index  ..  ..     
Protecting investors: investor protection  ..  ..    
Paying taxes: time  -0.033 -0.028  0.089 0.103 
Trading across borders: time export  -0.570 -0.457    
Enforcing contracts: time  -0.051 -0.044  .. .. 
Closing business: time  ..  ..     
•  Lower middle income countries 
Starting business: time  0.088  ..  0.364  .. 
Dealing with licences: time  ..  ..  ..  .. 
Employing workers: rigidity employment  -0.185  .. .. .. 
Registering property: time  -0.036  ..  .. .. 
Getting credit: legal rights index  ..  ..  ..  .. 
Protecting investors: investor protection  2.992  .. -14.038  -22.918   33
Paying taxes: time  0.005  ..  ..  .. 
Trading across borders: time export  -0.611 -0.332  -2.374 -2.703 
Enforcing contracts: time  -0.010  .. ..  .. 
Closing business: time  ..  ..  -6.385  -8.815 
•  Low income countries 
Starting business: time  ..  ..  ..  0.488 
Dealing with licences: time  -0.039 -0.056 0.245  -0.168 
Employing workers: rigidity employment  -0.202  -0.235  0.375  0.951 
Registering property: time  ..  -0.063  0.436  -0.333 
Getting credit: legal rights index  3.261 2.953  17.292   
Protecting investors: investor protection  ..  -2.015     
Paying taxes: time  ..  ..  0.108  -0.181 
Trading across borders: time export  0.697 .. 2.150 .. 
Enforcing contracts: time  -0.009 -0.007  ..  -0.083 
Closing business: time  ..  ..  ..  -12.367 
“Base” controls are the shares of labour with secondary and higher education and industry, size and age dummies 
The table reports only coefficients that are significant at 95% and bold indicates significance and “correct” sign.  
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Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Log of sales 4504 5.49264 2.04915 0 12.4292 6661 5.9918 1.92167 0 13.2794 6280 16.44414 2.719829 4.60517 27.0724
Log of fixed assets 3387 4.15603 2.3512 0 13.8155 4620 5.1531 1.97695 0 13.1632 1965 15.3984 3.034912 6.917706 32.23619
Log of employment 6122 3.27135 1.71443 0.69315 9.22103 9097 3.0937 1.64152 0.69315 9.20029 7724 3.526915 1.467668 0 11.51293
More than 3 competitors 6029 0.81904 0.38502 0 1 8479 0.81779 0.38604 0 1 7820 0.855755 0.351361 0 1
Log (1+ Export/Sales) 6055 0.0865 0.18374 0 0.69315 9039 0.0682 0.16503 0 0.69315 1624 0.520902 0.5870533 4.67E-05 7.07505
Ownership (privatized) 6153 0.15472 0.36167 0 1 9098 0.14223 0.3493 0 1 7820 0.19156 0.3935539 0 1
Ownership (private) 6153 0.5477 0.49776 0 1 9098 0.66047 0.47357 0 1 7820 0.747187 0.4346526 0 1
Ownership (foreign) 6153 0.14172 0.34879 0 1 9098 0.10156 0.30209 0 1 7820 0.016752 0.1283487 0 1
Cost of Financing 5864 2.52865 1.12673 1 4 8698 2.51127 1.13488 1 4 5251 2.308322 1.007763 1 4
Infrastructure 6122 1.53626 0.70084 1 4 9043 1.53655 0.72606 1 4 4059 2.275191 1.087544 1 4
Tax Rates 6060 2.76073 1.1082 1 4 8951 2.74908 1.10491 1 4 6649 2.52444 0.9888274 1 4
Customs/Foreing Trade regulations 5649 2.04231 1.12221 1 4 8267 1.91315 1.06626 1 4 2997 2.128462 1.037279 1 4
Business Licencing and Permits 5906 2.02218 1.07611 1 4 8776 1.97926 1.03787 1 4 4343 2.011513 0.984615 1 4
Macroeconomic Instability 5998 2.76242 1.11297 1 4 8823 2.51842 1.11587 1 4 5588 2.135469 0.9886097 1 4
Corruption 5713 2.2412 1.16193 1 4 8497 2.15523 1.13798 1 4 5191 2.455982 1.083213 1 4
Street Crime, Theft and Disorder 5857 1.95732 1.07245 1 4 8661 1.81573 1.00896 1 4 4893 2.21357 1.071047 1 4
Anti-competitive practices 5871 2.2526 1.11107 1 4 8739 2.30312 1.1136 1 4 5884 2.301156 0.9557925 1 4
Table 6. Summary statistics
2009 2005 2002  35
123456789 1 0
Log Employment .848*** (.015) .848*** (.015) .849*** (.014) .845*** (.015) .849*** (.014) .847*** (.015) .843*** (.015) .843*** (.015) .848*** (.014) .848*** (.015)
Log Fixed Assets .177*** (.011) .174*** (.011) .172*** (.011) .169*** (.011) .175*** (.011) .176*** (.011) .178*** (.011) .176*** (.011) .173*** (.011) .177*** (.011)
More than 3 competitors  -.081** (.040) -.078* (.040) -.074* (.040) -.076* (.041) -.077* (.040)  -.075* (.040) -.079* (.041) -.075* (.041) -.089** (.040) -.081** (.040)
Cost of Financing  -.034** (.014) -.040** (.019)
Infrastructure  -.026 (.021)  -.028 (.026)
Tax Rates -.027** (.013) -.036** (.018)
Customs/Foreing Trade Regulations .064*** (.013) .090*** (.016)
Business Licencing Permits  -.003 (.013)  -.014 (.018)
Macroeconomic Instability  -.008 (.013)  -.003 (.016)
Corruption  -.006 (.013) .001 (.018)
Street Crime, theft, disorder -.028** (.014) -.032* (.018)
Anticompetitive Practices .014 (.014) .016 (.017)
Constant 1.640*** (.164) 1.601*** (.164) 1.640*** (.164) 1.463*** (.164) 1.547*** (.162) 1.574*** (.166) 1.544*** (.170) 1.672*** (.156) 1.546*** (.161) 1.640*** (.164)
Observations 2955 3054 3030 2836 2955 3013 2861 2942 2953 2527
R squared 0.8356 0.8344 0.8366 0.8343 0.8345 0.8344 0.8341 0.8392 0.8345 0.8387
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Dummy for type of privatization YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
123456789 1 0
Log Employment .890*** (.017) .891*** (.016) .891*** (.017) .884*** (.017) .889*** (.017) .890*** (.017) .892*** (.017) .891*** (.017) .891*** (.016) .884*** (.018)
Log Fixed Assets .174*** (.012) .175*** (.012) .175*** (.012) .177*** (.012) .177*** (.012) .175*** (.012) .175*** (.012) .175*** (.012) .174*** (.012) .175*** (.014)
More than 3 competitors  .034 (.030)  .026 (.029)  .030 (.029)  .015 (.030)  .018 (.029)  .026 (.029)  .026 (.030)  .027 (.029)  .023 (.030)  .006 (.031)
Cost of Financing  -.015 (.010)  -.017 (.012)
Infrastructure  -.014 (.014)  -.023 (.017)
Tax Rates -.024** (.010) -.030** (.012)
Customs/Foreing Trade Regulations .040*** (.012) .056*** (.014)
Business Licencing Permits  .010 (.012)  .004 (.014)
Macroeconomic Instability  -.006 (.010)  .002 (.013)
Corruption  -.004 (.010)  -.006 (.012)
Street Crime, theft, disorder  -.018 (.011)  -.023 (.014)
Anticompetitive Practices .016 (.011) .031** (.012)
Constant 2.716*** (.104) 2.687*** (.097) 2.731*** (.100) 2.639*** (.098) 2.672*** (.098) 2.686*** (.099) 2.654*** (.102) 2.705*** (.102) 2.643*** (.096) 2.727*** (.111)
Observations 4011 4105 4077 3800 4003 4059 3900 3980 4020 3485
R squared 0.8786 0.8788 0.879 0.8784 0.8791 0.8789 0.8798 0.8792 0.8792 0.8804
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Dummy for type of privatization YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
123456789 1 0
Log Employment .866*** (.032) .879*** (.032) .878*** (.032) .846*** (.035) .867*** (.034) .877*** (.032) .876*** (.033) .869*** (.033) .885*** (.032) .841*** (.038)
Log Fixed Assets .249*** (.024) .237*** (.023) .240*** (.024) .244*** (.026) .239*** (.025) .239*** (.024) .246*** (.024) .246*** (.024) .237*** (.024) .253*** (.028)
More than 3 competitors   -.154** (.034)  -.145** (.065)  -.140** (.064)  -.165** (.071)  -.131** (.068)   -.143** (.064)  -.193*** (.066)  -.147** (.065)  -.143** (.065)  -.158** (.076)
Cost of Financing  -.034 (.023) -.049* (.029)
Infrastructure  .031 (.019)  -.001 (.026)
Tax Rates  -.017 (.021)  -.022 (.030)
Customs/Foreing Trade Regulations .101*** (.021) .096*** (.029)
Business Licencing Permits  .039 (.023)  .030 (.029)
Macroeconomic Instability  .024 (.022)  .028 (.032)
Corruption .046* (.021) .047* (.025)
Street Crime, theft, disorder  -.014 (.018)  -.037 (.025)
Anticompetitive Practices .018 (.019)  -.011 (.023)
Constant 10.689*** (.620) 10.730*** (.609) 10.767*** (.598) 10.761*** (.753) 10.762*** (.626) 10.712*** (.618) 10.580*** (.629) 10.654*** (.617) 10.726*** (.611) 10.711*** (.743)
Observations 1773 1795 1809 1584 1682 1803 1697 1754 1776 1363
R squared 0.8448 0.8427 0.8428 0.831 0.8348 0.8427 0.8447 0.84 0.8432 0.8371
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Dummy for type of privatization YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Table 7 - Impact of 2009 constraints on form revenues (OLS estimation with country and sector fixed effects)
Robust standard errors, clustered by country, industry and firm size (small, medium, large) in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5 %, *** significant at 1%
Robust standard errors, clustered by country, industry and firm size (small, medium, large) in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5 %, *** significant at 1%
Table 7 - Impact of 2002 constraints on form revenues (OLS estimation with country and sector fixed effects)
Table 7 - Impact of 2005 constraints on form revenues (OLS estimation with country and sector fixed effects)
Robust standard errors, clustered by country, industry and firm size (small, medium, large) in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5 %, *** significant at 1%  36
123456789 1 0
Log Employment .396 (.269) .380 (.288) .397 (.281) .425 (.292) .280 (.330) .257 (.331) .374 (.330) .422 (.280) .566** (.277) .596* (.315)
Log Fixed Assets .576** (.279) .592** (.296) .568** (.289) .543* (.300) .702** (.338) .735** (.335) .590* (.344) .549* (.292) .389 (.298) .368 (.334)
More than 3 competitors  .038 (.071)  .038 (.072)  .046 (.071)  .043 (.073)  .050 (.080)  .030 (.079)  .050 (.077)  .028 (.069)  .024 (.063)  .047 (.072)
Log (1+ Export/Sales) .639 (.578) .745 (.574) .718 (.564) .753 (.548) .669 (.671)  .655 (.671) .458 (.600) .598 (.555) .562 (.503) .544 (.516)
Cost of Financing  -.036 (.022)  -.032 (.023)
Infrastructure  -.043 (.038)  -.047 (.042)
Tax Rates -.055** (.014)  -.047 (.030)
Customs/Foreing Trade Regulations .016 (.028) .041 (.038)
Business Licencing Permits  -.026 (.032)  -.006 (.030)
Macroeconomic Instability  -.029 (.023)  -.018 (.025)
Corruption  -.005 (.022) .010 (.025)
Street Crime, theft, disorder  -.022 (.026)  -.019 (.031)
Anticompetitive Practices .023 (.021) .020 (.027)
Constant 1.384** (.599) 1.505** (.602) 1.596*** (.570) 1.471*** (.552) 1.297** (.662) 1.237* (.662) 1.380** (.623) 1.544*** (.568) 1.602*** (.559) 1.899*** (.565)
Observations 1996 2424 2407 2249 2339 2388 2265 2328 2329 1996
Hansen J statistic 9.96 9.977 10.396 10.175 8.788 9.126 11.327 11.743 11.017 12.493
p-value 0.126 0.125 0.108 0.1175 0.1859 0.1666 0.078 0.068 0.0879 0.051
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Dummy for type of privatization YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
123456789 1 0
Log Employment .568*** (.138) .592*** (.135) .605*** (.133) .638*** (.137) .571*** (.145) .580*** (.141) .549*** (.150) .601*** (.134) .574*** (.139) .553*** (.206)
Log Fixed Assets .487*** (.150) .460*** (.145) .444*** (.142) .401*** (.151) .476*** (.156) .466*** (.152) .485*** (.164) .444*** (.145) .479*** (.148) .481** (.234)
More than 3 competitors  .108** (.051) .115** (.053) .119** (.053) .101** (.051) .111** (.054)  .122** (.052) .122** (.056) .112** (.035) .118** (.055)  .095 (.057)
Log (1 + exports/sales) .156 (.535) .336 (.536) .390 (.541) .344 (.532) .328 (.562) .424 (.564) .314 (.567) .407 (.549) .402 (.528) .296 (.633)
Cost of Financing  .002 (.016) .015 (.023)
Infrastructure -.041** (.019) -.045** (.028)
Tax Rates -.025 (.014)  -.031 (.019)
Customs/Foreing Trade Regulations .032 (.017) .058 (.033)
Business Licencing Permits   -.002 (.019)   -.007 (.025)
Macroeconomic Instability  -.029 (.018)   -.039 (.025)
Corruption  -.016 (.017)  -.034 (.023)
Street Crime, theft, disorder  -.016 (.016)  -.021 (.024)
Anticompetitive Practices .023 (.016) .033 (.020)
Constant 2.264*** (.532) 2.484*** (.492) 2.553*** (.480) 2.529*** (.524) 2.445*** (.522) 2.686*** (.099) 2.479*** (.545) 2.492*** (.514) 2.356*** (.504) 2.393*** (.758)
Observations 3079 3137 3117 2913 3056 3106 2984 3035 3072 2543
Hansen J statistic 10.561 8.934 9.169 10.325 9.54 9.494 8.111 9.109 7.874 8.882
p-value 0.102 0.1773 0.1643 0.111 0.145 0.1476 0.23 0.167 0.247 0.18
Country fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sector fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Dummy for type of privatization YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Note: All models were estimated using IV s for Log Employment, Log Assets, Log (1 + Export/sales) and three Ownership Dummies. The IV s are: Firm's age, skill ratio (college/high school), skill ratio - age interaction, location (city), % change in fixed assets in 
previous period, % change in exports in previous period, full time employees in previous period. The skill ratio and the skill ratio-age interaction were also interacted with regional (CEB, SEE and CIS) dummies. The constraint variables at the firm level represent 
the average of the constraint reported by the other firms in the same year, country, 2-digit sector and firm size (small, medium, large).
Table 8 - Impact of 2002 constraints on form revenues (IV estimation with country and sector fixed effects)
Robust standard errors, clustered by country, industry and firm size (small, medium, large) in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5 %, *** significant at 1%
Table 8 - Impact of 2005 constraints on form revenues (IV estimation with country and sector fixed effects)
Robust standard errors, clustered by country, industry and firm size (small, medium, large) in brackets. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5 %, *** significant at 1%
Note: All models were estimated using IV s for Log Employment, Log Assets, Log (1 + Export/sales) and three Ownership Dummies. The IV s are: Firm's age, skill ratio (college/high school), skill ratio - age interaction, location (city), % change in fixed assets in 
previous period, % change in exports in previous period, full time employees in previous period. The skill ratio and the skill ratio-age interaction were also interacted with regional (CEB, SEE and CIS) dummies. The constraint variables at the firm level represent 
the average of the constraint reported by the other firms in the same year, country, 2-digit sector and firm size (small, medium, large).
 